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Weitz, Morris (1916-1981), American philosopher of aesthetics who focused primarily on 
ontology, interpretation, and literary criticism. 
 
Weitz’ Initial Theory of Art. Morris Weitz’ initial theory of art was provided in his book, 
Philosophy of the Arts (Weitz 1950). Here Weitz calls his theory of art “empirical” and 
“organic,” and he defined “art” as “an organic complex or integration of expressive elements 
embodied in a sensuous medium” (51). By “empirical” he means that his theory answers to the 
evidence provided by actual works of art. “Organic,” for Weitz, means that each element is to be 
considered in relation to the others in a living and not merely mechanical way. Weitz also has a 
broad understanding of “expressive,” which refers to an artistic property that functions as a 
semiotic sign, either of a specific emotional feeling, an emotional quality, or another sign of an 
emotional feature. These expressive signs are at once presentational and representational in his 
view, by which he means that they both are something and are about something (at the very least 
they are about emotion or emotional qualities). In this way his early theory of the art object can 
be classified as a formalist one that expands upon the traditions of Clive Bell and Roger Fry in a 
way that deepens the concept of form so that it provides particular kinds of emotional content, 
thereby incorporating the theories of John Dewey and a list of practicing artists and critics that 
includes DeWitt Parker, A.C. Bradley, Albert Barnes, Martha Graham, Frank Lloyd Wright and 
others. Indeed, in Weitz’ initial theory form and content are identical; he denies that in art these 
are separable dichotomies, since both refer to the “what” and the “how” of an artwork as a whole 
(see 48-9). 
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Weitz’ Revised Theory of Art. Weitz explicitly modified the above theory of art in his 1956 
article, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” which was one of the Matchette Foundation prize 
essays for 1955. In this article he overturned his original claim in Philosophy of the Arts that his 
empirical and organic theory could produce a closed or real definition of art. It is this revised 
version that many philosophers have considered the sine qua non in support of the position that 
theories of art should be “open.” Supporters of this view, for similar but non-identical reasons, 
included W.B. Gallie, W. E. Kennick and Benjamin R. Tilghman. Detractors included M.H. 
Abrams, M.W. Beal, Lee Brown, George Dickie, and Maurice Mandelbaum.  A longer list of 
philosophers who addressed the issue of defining art in the late 1950s through the early 1970s 
can be found in Kennick 1979, 123-4. 
 
An “open” definition, on Weitz’ view, is not merely a convenience for avoiding the difficulty of 
identifying necessary and sufficient conditions. Instead Weitz claims that there can be no closed 
definition of art because art is the kind of product and enterprise that is so creative, adventurous 
and ever-changing that no closed set of defining properties or conditions can be found. Weitz’ 
claim is that the concept of art is open because “art” is a concept like “game,” as described by the 
later Wittgenstein, that names an artifact of cultural practice or language that requires the consent 
of those who participate in the practice in order to determine what falls within and what falls 
outside of the purview of that concept. (See Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.) In 
short, his point is that art is the sort of concept that requires that any new or emerging artwork be 
subject to a decision on the part of the art-competent agents involved about whether or not to 
either extend the existing concept of art to cover it, to reject it as “not art,” or to amend the 
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existing concept of art so that it can include the new work.  Since there can be no necessary and 
sufficient conditions for how to apply the concept of art to new cases, there can be no real 
definition of art in Weitz’ view.  
 
Weitz thus abandons the view that the definition of art he provided in Philosophy of the Arts 
captures everything art is or could be. He continued to endorse the idea, however, that 
expressive, semiotic significance is important for understanding art. In fact, Weitz suggests that 
existing definitions of art are not without value in the sense that we can mine them for their 
insights about the important features of artworks. His recommendation is simply that rather than 
accept these definitions as closed, we instead see these definitional strategies as 
recommendations for us to attend to whatever features are highlighted by the theory at hand. An 
irony is that in claiming that art must resist all definitions of the “necessary-and-sufficient-
condition” sort, Weitz has provided at least a necessary condition for new theories of art: that 
they must, in all cases, be open definitions. 
 
Interpretation and Truth Claims. In his article, “Does Art Tell the Truth?” and in chapter eight 
of Philosophy of the Arts Weitz asks if art can embody truth claims. His answer is “yes,” 
particularly in reference to literature, which can be linguistically referential and thus make claims 
about the world that are either true or false. Besides these first-order truth claims, Weitz holds 
that works of literature can also have second-order “depth meanings,” by which he means that 
they contain meanings that imply the truth of claims not explicitly stated. An example he gives is 
Richard Wright’s novel, Native Son, which despite the absence of explicit statement, can be 
interpreted to make claims that can be proven either true or false, such as claims about the 
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capacity of the modern man to make free choices that are not destructive. Non-linguistic arts 
such as painting, Weitz claims, can also make truth claims, but they do so through the use of 
symbols. As to music Weitz is less certain; the most he will say is that some music contains 
analogues of truth claims, by which he means, for example, that a musical piece such as 
Beethoven’s last quartet, Opus 135, could be (and indeed was) interpreted by critics and by 
Beethoven himself to mean something analogous to “life is good” or “that affirmation of life is 
the answer to doubt” (Weitz 1950, 152). If this is right then music can make at least overall 
assertions or truth claims. One could imagine, in light of this, that any music that could be 
conceived as representational or metaphorical in some way, such as Billy Strayhorn’s “Take the 
‘A Train’” (made famous by Duke Ellington) or that is a hybrid of story and music, such as 
Sergei Prokofiev’s “Peter and the Wolf,” could be conceived as providing musical assertions or 
truth claims that do not differ too much from those found in literature. These musical pieces, for 
example, could be conceived of as making a musical statement about the qualitative nature of 
urban train riding or about the audacity and bravery of little boys. For arts like dance and theatre 
one can speculate that Weitz would find that they can also embody truth claims – linguistically, 
symbolically, or (like some music) via analogues to truth claims. 
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